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I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing reports of sexual abuse in the United States,
much attention has been given to the conflict between the interests of
victims and those of defendants in criminal sex offense cases.' Grow-
ing public awareness of the problems associated with.the prosecution
of sex abuse cases2 has led many states to alter their rules of evidence
and criminal procedure. 3 Many states now allow a child's testimony to
be videotaped and shown at trial or allow the child to testify via
closed-circuit television.4 Nebraska recently passed LB 90,5 which
1. Mbvies such as Child's Cry (CBS television broadcast, Aug. 19,1988) have brought
thb public's attention to this issue. Media coverage notes that the legal process of
in1.restigation and trial may result in psychological trauma to victims. See also
Milton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Victim/Witnesses in Sex Offense
Pioceedings, in CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW (J. Bulkley ed. 1984); Ber-
lifter & Barbier, The Testimony of the Child Victim of Sexual Assault, 40 J. SOC.
ISSuEs 125 (1984).
2. Although this Comment focuses on child sexual abuse cases, prosecutors are
faced with difficulties in any case involving the testimony of children. Much at-
tehtion has been focused on the trauma a child experiences from police interroga-
tion, repeated interviews, and the trial process. See Pynoos & Eth, The Child as a
Witness to Homicide, 40 J. Soc. ISSUES 87 (1984). Young children often are found
competent to testify, and in such cases, the state's interest in punishing sex abus-
ers opposes its interest in protecting minors. See generally V. DEFRANCIS, PRO-
TECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS (1969);
Burgess & Holmstrom, The Child and Family in the Court Process, in SEXUAL
ASSAULT OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS (1978); Melton, Psycholegal Issues in
Child Victims' Interaction with the Legal System, 5 VICTIMOLOGY: INT'L J. 274
(1980).
However, little scientific evidence indicates that children are harmed by their
participation in trials. See Melton, Children's Testimony in Cases of Alleged Sex-
ual Abuse, 8 ADVANCES DEv. & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 179 (1987) [hereinafter Mel-
ton, Children's Testimony].
3. In addition to the Federal Rules of Evidence, some states have enacted specific
hearsay exceptions for the admission of statements made by victims of sexual
abuse to such persons as therapists or parents. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.40.110
(Cum. Supp. 1988); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1416 (Cum Supp. 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 18-3-411(3) (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West Supp. 1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.460(dd) (1983); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(3) (1988); R.I. GEN.
LAwS § 14-1-69 (Cum. Supp. 1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Cum. Supp.
1988); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (1988). For a discussion of the constitutional-
ity of such statutes see Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confron-
tation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV.
19, 22-29 (1985).
4. For statutes regarding videotaped testimony, see ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.047 (1984);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4252 to -4253 (Cum. Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
413 (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53 (West
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permits the use of videotaped testimony or in camera testimony of not
only child victims of sexual abuse, but also of child victims or wit-
nesses of other felonies. 6
Videotaping and in camera procedures allow a child who has been a
victim of sexual abuse to be spared the ordeal of testifying in open
court in front of a jury and spectators. In addition, videotaping the
testimony may facilitate the child's recovery by limiting the number of
times the child must recount the traumatic details of the abuse.7
Although the use of videotaped and in camera testimony may re-
duce the stress of testifying, serious questions arise concerning the
constitutionality of such proceduress For example, the use of in cam-
era testimony may violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to
confront adverse witnesses at trial.9 The sixth amendment guarantees
1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Burns Cur. Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 1205 (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 92.304 (Vernon 1989); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-15-401 to 15-403 (1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (1978); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 190.32 (Consol. Supp. 1989); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 753 (West Supp.
1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-12-9 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-35-15.5 (Cum. Supp. 1988). Although this
Comment will discuss accommodations for child victims of sexual abuse, these
accommodations generally also apply to cases involving children who witness
felonies.
For statutes regarding the use of closed-circuit television, see ALA. CODE § 15-
25-3 (1986); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-8-55
(Supp. 1987); N.Y. CRIM PROC. LAW §§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
5. LB 90, 1988 Neb. Laws 70-73, was passed on April 7, 1988, signed by Governor Kay
Orr on April 7, 1988, and effective on July 9, 1988, (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 29-1917, -1925 & -1926 (Cum. Supp. 1988)). LB 90 is not exclusively designed
for child sexual abuse cases; it also covers cases involving child witnesses to a
felony. However, for purposes of this Comment, the bill will be discussed in ref-
erence to child sexual abuse prosecutions.
6. This Comment will discuss LB 90 in the context of sexual abuse prosecutions.
7. U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: FINAL REPORT
(1984). See also MacFarlane, Diagnostic Evaluations and the Use of Videotapes
in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 135 (1985).
8. See Note, The Use of Videotaped Testimony of Victims in Cases Involving Child
Sexual Abuse: A Constitutional Dilemma, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 261 (1985).
Prosecutors argue that the admission of videotaped testimony is consistent
with the defendant's constitutional rights, but defendants argue that the admissi-
bility of such testimony is unconstitutional. See Ginkowski, The Abused Child.
The Prosecutor's Terrifying Nightmare, 1 CRIM. JUST. 30 (1986). However, many
defendants argue for use of videotaped testimony instead of the live witness be-
cause videotaped testimony has less impact on the jury.
9. In camera testimony typically is taken using a two-way closed-circuit television
procedure. Both the courtroom and the room in which the child testifies are
equipped with television cameras for transmission and television monitors for
viewing. The monitor in the child's room televises the defendant and the other
parties in the courtroom. The monitor in the courtroom simultaneously shows
the minor and the examining attorney. See, e.g., Hochheiser v. Superior Court,
161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 788, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 279-80 (1984).
The procedure is consistent with LB 90, which provides that "all persons in
[Vol. 68:372
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the defendant the right to be present at the trial, to confront adverse
witnesses, and to cross-examine those witnesses.1 0 In general, the
United States Supreme Court has stated that confrontation:
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus im-
pressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie
by the possibility of a penalty for perjury;
(2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth;"
(3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the de-
meanor of the witness making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing
his credibility. 1 '
The Supreme Court also has stated that the confrontation clause
reflects a preference for "face-to-face" confrontation.12 However, in-
stead of having the witness appear in person, in the same room as the
defendeant, LB 90 provides for the use of in camera testimony.'3 Ac-
cording to LB 90, the child witness must be in a position to see the
defendant on camera at all times, but the constitutionality of this spe-
cial acdommodation must be examined and contrasted with the de-
fendant's right to confrontation.14 Specifically, whether viewing the
defend~nt on a closed-circuit monitor satisfies the principles of face-
to-face 'onfrontation, whether being removed from the jury's physical
presence during the testimony is permissible, and whether a compel-
ling need is established for the use of such an accommodation will be
examined.
In addition, constitutional problems may arise with videotaped tes-
timony. Videotaped testimony is a form of hearsay-evidence
presented in court of an out-of-court statement, which is offered to
show the truth of matter asserted.' 5 Arguably, the type of videotaped
testimony taken under LB 90 is permissible under either the pre-ex-
isting exception for former testimony' 6 or as a special legislatively cre-
ated exception.' 7 However, the Nebraska Legislature's special
accommodation for child witnesses should not be exempt from consti-
tutional scrutiny. Potentially, child witness accommodations may vio-
late a defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation. The
Supreme Court has stated that the rules of evidence permitting cer-
the room shall be visible except the camera operator." LB 90 § 3(5); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-1926(5) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
10. See infra note 54.
11. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (footnote and citation omitted).
12. Id.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
14. For a discussion of the use of in camera proceedings in criminal trials see Annota-
tion, CMosed-Circuit Television Witness Examination, 61 A.L.R. 4TH 1155 (1988).
15. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Although hearsay evidence is often inadmissible against a
defendant, courts recognize several exceptions. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(1);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803(1) (1985).
16. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(a) (1985).
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-802 (1985).
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tain types of hearsay are not equivalent to the values protected by the
sixth amendment.'8
[W]e have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even
though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized
hearsay exception ....
[Tihe modification of a State's hearsay rules to create new exceptions for the
admission of evidence against a defendant, will often raise questions of com-
patibility with the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. Such
questions require attention to the reasons for, and the basic scope of, the pro-
tections offered by the Confrontation Clause.19
LB 90 provides for the defendant's presence at the videotaping and
for the defendant's counsel to cross-examine witnesses.20 However,
the videotaping procedure is done outside the presence of the jury and
later is shown to the jury at the time of trial. This Comment addresses
the issue of whether a defendant's constitutional right to confronta-
tion is consistent with Nebraska's decision to provide for a child's testi-
mony to be taken via videotape and used in lieu of live testimony.
Specifically, this Comment focuses on whether the provisions of cross-
examination at the time of the testimony are adequate under the con-
frontation clause, whether the absence of the jury at the videotaping is
constitutionally permissible, and whether adequate justification exists
for using the tape at the time of the trial because of the witness's un-
availability and reliability of the testimony.
Part II of this Comment examines the content and history of LB 90
and compares it with similar statutes in other jurisdictions. Part III
examines the Supreme Court's analysis of the principles underlying
the confrontation clause and focuses on how various states have dealt
with in camera testimony in criminal trials, including a recent Ne-
braska decision. Part IV analyzes LB 90 to determine whether the in
camera procedures meet the constitutional standards set forth by the
Supreme Court concerning the confrontation clause.21
18. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970).
19. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
21. This Comment does not examine the due process questions presented by vide-
otaping and in camera procedures. Potential problems include the right to a jury
trial or the infringement of the presumption of innocence recognized as an essen-
tial element of a fair trial in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1975). Few courts
have addressed the possible infringements on due process. In Hochheiser v. Su-
perior Court, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984), the defendant's right
to confrontation was violated by the use of in camera testimony authorized by
state statute. The court addressed the problems associated with the use of the
videotaped depositions or closed-circuit television to admit children's testimony
in criminal trials:
[Tihere are serious questions about the effects on the jury of using
closed-circuit television [or videotaped testimony] to present the testi-
mony of an absent witness since the camera becomes the juror's eyes,
selecting and commenting upon what is seen.... [Tihere may be signifi-
cant differences between testimony by closed-circuit television and testi-
[Vol. 68:372
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Part V examines the principles of the confrontation clause as set
forth by the Supreme Court in cases where prior testimony was used
at trial and focuses on methods various states have used to deal with
challenges to the videotaping procedures. Finally, Part VI analyzes
LB 90 to determine whether the bill meets the constitutional stan-
dards for admitting prior testimony in accordance with the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to confrontation.
mony face-to-face with the jury because of distortion and exclusion of
evidence.... "[The lens or camera angle chosen can make a witness look
small and weak or large and strong. Lighting can alter demeanor in a
number of ways.... Variations in lens or angle, may result in failure to
convey subtle nuances, including changes in witness demeanor... [O]ff
camera evidence is necessarily excluded while the focus is on another
part of the body ..." Thus, such use of closed-circuit television [or video-
taped testimony] may affect the jurors' impressions of the witness' de-
meanor and credibility. Also it is quite conceivable that the credibility of
a witness whose testimony is presented via [television] may be enhanced
by the phenomenon called status-conferral; it is recognized that the me-
dia bestows prestige and enhances the authority of an individual by legit-
imizing his status. Such considerations are of particular importance
when, as here, the demeanor and credibility of the witness are crucial to
the state's case.
Id. at 786-87, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278-79 (citations omitted)(quoting Note, The Crimi-
nal Videotape Trial, Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 ORE. L. REv. 567, 575-
77 (1976)). For a discussion of the confrontation issue in Hochheiser v. Superior
Court see infra text accompanying note 73.
For scientific support of this proposition see Farmer, Williams, Lee, Cundick,
Hdwell & Rooker, Juror Perceptions of Trial Testimony as a Function of the
Method of Presentation, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW: RESEARCH FRONTIERS,
209 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth & N. Vidmar eds. 1976); Miller, The Effects of Video-
taped Testimony on Juror Response, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW: RESEARCH
FRONTIERS 185 (G. Bermant, C. Nemeth & N. Vidmar eds. 1976). See also Kipper,
Television Camera Movement as a Source of Perceptual Information, 30 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 295 (1986).
Some courts suggest the jury might think that because the child had to be
removed from the courtroom the defendant must be guilty, violating the pre-
sumption of innocence. See, e.g., arguments made by the defense attorneys in Coy
v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988); Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App.
1988); and State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986). A related con-
cern with the use of in camera testimony involves due process questions impli-
cated by the unknown effect of viewing the defendant "on television." The child
may think that the defendant is not real or that the entire proceeding is a game,
i.e., the "program" will go away once the monitor is turned off. If the child could
not distinguish between reality and make-believe, the child might be more likely
to lie. For a discussion of children's competency to testify, see Melton, Children's
Competency to Testify, 5 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 73 (1981); Melton, Sexually Abused
Children & the Legal System" Some Policy Recommendations, 13 AM. J. FAM.
THERAPY 61 (1985).
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II. STATES PERMITTING THE USE OF VIDEOTAPED AND IN
CAMERA TESTIMONY
A. Other Jurisdictions
Many of the states allowing the testimony of child victims to be
videotaped and used at trial, or providing for the use of in camera tes-
timony, have similar statutes. 22 However, the states vary on the issue
of what findings must be made before the special accommodations will
be implemented.
Most states allow a child's testimony to be taped, or taken in cam-
era, at the request of the prosecutor.23 At least six states require the
court to make a specific finding that the child is likely to suffer psy-
chological harm if required to appear in court, and thus, is unavailable
to testify at trial.24 For example, in Colorado, testimony of child wit-
nesses may be videotaped upon "recommendations from the child's
therapist or any other person having direct contact with the child,
whose recommendations are based on specific behavioral indicators
exhibited by the child."25
The procedures for videotaping testimony and the findings neces-
sary to admit the tape into evidence at trial also vary from state to
state.26 States requiring a finding of likely psychological harm to the
child before a deposition can be videotaped also require an additional
finding of psychological harm at trial before the tape can be admitted
into evidence.27 States that do not require a court to make specific
findings regarding the child's ability to testify at trial before ordering
the taping do not specify the circumstances for admitting the tape at
trial.28
Most states that allow videotaping or in camera accommodations
require the defendant, the defendant's counsel, the prosecutor, and
the judge to be present during the child's testimony.29 Further, most
states require that the defendant have a full opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the child witness.3 0
22. See supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (1978).
24. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.53(1) (West Supp. 1986)("substantial likelihood [of]
... at least moderate emotional or mental harm"); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(b)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988)("a substantial likelihood [of] severe emotional or
mental strain").
25. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3413(3) (1986).
26. Note, supra note 8.
27. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-413(4) (1986); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04(7)(b)
(West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
28. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253(b) (Cum. Supp. 1988); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-
2036 (1985).
29. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West 1982).
30. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-44-203 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 865 (West 1982).
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B. Nebraska: LB 9031
1. Legislative History
LB 90 first was introduced in the Judiciary Committee of the Ne-
31. LB 90 reads:
AN ACT relating to criminal procedure; to amend section 29-1917,
Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943; to state intent; to authorize
the taking of videotape depositions and in camera. testimony of certain
children as prescribed; to define a term; to authorize rules of procedure;
to harmonize provisions; and to repeal the original section.
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska,
Section 1. The Legislature recognizes that obtaining testimony in a
criminal prosecution from a child victim... may be a delicate matter and
may require some special considerations. It is the intent of the
Legislature to promote, facilitate, and preserve the testimony of such
child victim or child witness in a criminal prosecution to the fullest
extent possible consistent with the constitutional right to confrontation
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States and Article I, section 11, of the Nebraska Constitution.
Sec. 2. That section 29-1917, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska,
1943, be amended to read as follows:
29-1917. (1) Except as provided in section 3 of this act, at any time
after the filing of an indictment or information in a felony prosection,
the prosecuting attorney or the defendant may request the court to allow
the taking of a deposition of any person other than the defendant who
may be a witness in the trial of the offense. The court may order the
taking of the deposition when it finds the testimony of the witness:
(a) May be material or relevant to the issue to be determined at thd
trial of the offense; or
(b) May be of assistance to the parties in the preparation of their
respective cases.
(2) An order granting the taking of a deposition shall include the time
and place for taking such deposition and such other conditions as the
court determines to be just.
(3) The proceedings in taking the deposition of a witness pursuant to
this section and returning it to the court shall be governed in all respects
as the taking of depositions in civil cases.
(4) A deposition taken pursuant to this section may be used at trial by
any party solely for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of the deponent as a witness.
Sec. 3. (1) Upon request of the prosecuting or defense attorney and
upon a showing of compelling need, the court shall order the taking of a
videotape deposition of a child victim of or child witness to any offense
punishable as a felony. The deposition ordinarily shall be in lieu of
courtroom or in camera testimony by the child. If the court orders a
videotape deposition, the court shall:
(a) Designate the time and place for taking the deposition. The
deposition may be conducted in the courtroom, the judge's chambers, or
any other location suitable for videotaping;,
(b) Assure adequate time for the defense attorney to complete
discovery before taking the deposition; and
(c) Preside over the taking of the videotape deposition in the same
manner as if the child were called as a witness for the prosecution during
the course of the trial.
(2) Unless otherwise required by the court, the deposition shall be
conducted in the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defense
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:372
braska Legislature in 1985. The bill authorized videotaping the testi-
attorney, the defendant, and any other person deemed necessary by the
court, including the parent or guardian of the child with whom the child
is familiar. Such parent, guardian, counselor, or other person shall be
allowed to sit with or near the child unless the court determines that
such person would be disruptive to the child's testimony.
(3) At any time subsequent to the taking of the original videotape
deposition and upon sufficient cause shown, the court shall order the
taking of additional videotape depositions to be admitted at the time of
the trial.
(4) If the child testifies at trial in person rather than by videotape
deposition, the taking of the child's testimony may, upon request of the
prosecuting attorney and upon a showing of compelling need, be
conducted in camera.
(5) Unless otherwise required by the court, the child shall testify in
the presence of the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney, the
defendant, and any other person deemed necessary by the court,
including the parent or guardian of the child victim or child witness or a
counselor or other person with whom the child is familiar. Such parent,
guardian, counselor, or other person shall be allowed to sit with or near
the child unless the court determines that such person would be
disruptive to the child's testimony. Unless waived by the defendant, all
persons in the room shall be visible on camera except the camera
operator.
(6) If deemed necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the child's
testimony, the court may direct that during the testimony the child shall
at all times be in a position to see the defendant live or on camera.
(7) For purposes of this section, child shall mean a person eleven
years of age or younger at the time the motion to take the deposition is
made or at the time of the taking of in camera testimony at trial.
(8) Nothing in this section shall restrict the court from conducting
the pretrial deposition or in camera proceedings in any manner deemed
likely to facilitate and preserve a child's testimony to the fullest extent
possible, consistent with the right to confrontation guaranteed in the
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
section 11, of the Nebraska Constitution. In deciding whether there is a
compelling need that child testimony accommodation is required by
pretrial videotape deposition, in camera live testimony, in camera
videotape testimony, or any other accommodation, the court shall make
particularized finding on the record of:
(a) The nature of the offense;
(b) The significance of the child's testimony to the case;
(c) The likelihood of obtaining the child's testimony without
modification of trial procedure or with a different modification involving
less substantial digression from trial procedure than the modification
under consideration;
(d) The child's age;
(e) The child's psychological maturity and understanding; and
(f) The nature, degree, and duration of potential injury to the child
from testifying.
(9) The court may order an independent examination by a
psychologist or psychiatrist if the defense attorney requests the
opportunity to rebut the showing of compelling need produced by the
prosecuting attorney. Such examination shall be conducted in the child's
county of residence.
(10) After a finding of compelling need by the court, neither party
may call the child witness to testify as a live witness at the trial before
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mony of child witnesses and the use of in camera testimony of child
witnesses.3 2 Although LB 90 passed unanimously in the Unicameral,
Governor Robert Kerrey, who had concerns about the constitutional-
ity of the legislation, vetoed the bill.
However, support for LB 90 did not end with Governor Kerrey's
veto. In 1986, LB 90 was reintroduced with some minor changes.3 3 At
the public hearing on the merits of LB 90, many senators, experts, and
interested citizens spoke in favor of the bill.34 The focus of testimony
the jury unless that party demonstrates that the compelling need no
longer exists.
(11) Nothing in this section shall limit the right of access of the media
or the public to open court.
(12) Nothing in this section shall preclude discovery by the defendant
as set forth in section 29-1912.
(13) The Supreme Court may adopt and promulgate rules of
procedure to administer this section, which rules shall not be in conflict
with laws governing such matters.
Sec. 4. That original section 29-1917, Reissue Revised Statutes of
Nebraska, 1943, is repealed.
1988 Neb. Laws 70-73 (relevant sections codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1917,
-1925 & -1926 (Cum. Supp. 1988)).
32. LB 90 was introduced to amend NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1917, which permitted the
taking of depositions in criminal trials, but did not specifically authorize the tak-
ing and use of videotaped depositions. The bill originally was introduced as LB
90, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985) and again as LB 90, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
LB 90 was re-introduced by Senator Sandra Scofield, who stated:
The bill is intended to allow child victims or witnesses in a felony
case to testify by means of a videotaped deposition in. lieu of testifying in
person in court. The procedure outlined in the bill for using this option
is the same as if the child were called as a witness for the prosecution
during the trial. The bill states that if the deposition is received into
evidence, the child will not be allowed to testify in court.
LB 90 is intended to reduce some of the emotional trauma associated
with the court proceeding for the child but does, however, still require
the child to face the accused during the depoiftion or in camera proceed-
ing. This provision insures the accused's right to confront his or her ac-
cusers, thereby protecting the accuser's sixth amendment right to
confront witnesses against him or her.
INTRODUCER'S STATEMENT OF INTENT, LB 90, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., (Feb. 11, 1987).
33. Josephine Potuto, a professor of criminal and constitutional law at the University
of Nebraska College of Law, helped revise LB 90 after it was introduced for the
first time and again after Governor Kerrey vetoed the bill. Professor Potuto indi-
cated that LB 90 needed to be revised because it originally was drafted using the
Texas videotaping statute as a model. Interview with Josephine Potuto, Profes-
sor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law, Lincoln, Neb. (June 1988).
The Texas statute recently was declared to be unconstitutional. See infra text
accompanying notes 127-36 for a discussion of the challenge to the Texas statute
made in Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert denied, 108 S.
Ct. 130 (1988).
34. At the Feb. 12, 1987, public hearing, proponents of LB 90 were: Senator Sandra
Scofield, Dean Skokan and Richard Boucher of the Nebraska County Attorney
Association, Chris Hanus of the Department of Social Services, Jenny Jorgensen
of the Nebraska County Attorney Association, Deborah Suttle of the Nebraska
Parent Teachers Association, and Joan and Bobbie Jo Hunter. Opponents of LB
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was the accommodation of child witnesses.35 The speakers said they
thought videotaping and in camera proceedings would reduce the
trauma that sexually abused children undergo during the prosecution
of sexual abuse cases.36 For example, the speakers suggested that a
nonpublic videotaping, or in camera proceedings, would be less intimi-
dating to a child than public testimony and that the videotaping proce-
dure would reduce the number of times a child victim would be
required to testify concerning the traumatic events.37
During the hearing, Josephine Potuto, a professor of criminal and
constitutional law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, ad-
90 were: Dennis Keefe and Dorothy Walker of the Nebraska Criminal Defense
Attorneys Association, William J. Mueller of the Nebraska Bar Association, and
William F. McIver II.
35. Other testimony involved the effect the procedures would have on children prone
to lie. See, e.g., Videotaping of Depositions of Minors for Use in Criminal Prose-
cutions: Public Hearing on LB 90 Before the Judiciary Committee, 90th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1987) [hereinafter Public Hearing](statement of William F. McIver II).
However, under LB 90 attorneys (not counselors or therapists as in State v. War-
ford, 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986)) will question the child and must avoid
leading questions. Because the child will be subject to the same questioning that
he or she would encounter in the courtroom with the defendant in full view, the
concern for lying should not be any greater than with the witness testifying in
open court.
36. Professor Josephine Potuto said videotaped testimony enables the child to spend
only a brief time recounting the events, rather than six months or a year re-
hashing the testimony in preparation for testimony at trial. Public Hearing,
supra note 35 (statement of Josephine Potuto).
37. Chris Hanus, Administrator of the Human Services Division for the Department
of Social Services, testified in favor of LB 90. He discussed the trauma many
children face when brought in to testify about sexual abuse. He stated that the
Department of Social Services recognized two important recent committee re-
ports recommending similar laws. First, Governor Kerrey's 1984 Task Force on
Violence Against Women and Children found that repeated interrogations of the
child during the investigation and in the courtroom may be more traumatic to the
child than the abuse itself, and thus, many states provide fzjr videotaped deposi-
tions of child sexual abuse victims if the court finds that further testimony by the
child would damage the child. Second, the National Council of Juvenile Family
Court Judges endorsed 73 recommendations published by a committee of presid-
ing judges. The judges represented the 40 largest urban courts in which 60 per-
cent of child abuse and neglect cases are heard. The report stated that a child's
physical or mental health can be threatened through abuse or neglect by parents
or through the insensitivity of a rigid legal or administrative system with no re-
gard for delay. The justice system tends to be overly formalized at the expense of
the child victim. The legal system must treat children with special courtesy, re-
spect, and fairness. Judges must work with attorneys, law enforcement, child
protection agencies, and state and local funding sources to improve facilities, serv-
ices, and procedures affecting children who appear in court. Frequent recesses,
confidentiality for the name and address of the child, removal of courtroom ob-
servers during sensitive testimony, separation of the victim and the accused, testi-
mony in chambers through closed-circuit television, expeditious return of
evidence, and other victim services should be assured to all children in court.
Public Hearing, supra note 35 (statement of Chris Hanus).
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dressed the constitutional issues surrounding the bill. Professor
Potuto stated that the bill did meet the requirements of the U.S. Con-
stitution's confrontation clause3 8 and that it was an appropriate policy
choice to make special accommodations for child witnesses.3 9 She
posed the following question to those present at the hearing:
[D]oes the State of Nebraska through its representative officials want to take
the position that the child witness's testimony should be encouraged and...
accommodate [the witness] . . . [setting] some standardized guidelines for
judges throughout this state to use? Or does the state want to stand silent on
the subject and leave vulnerable, the most vulnerable in our society, the least
protected?
The Legislature answered the question by passing LB 90, and this
time, the new Governor, Kay Orr, signed the bill.
2. The Videotaping and In Camera Procedures
One of the reasons legislators supported LB 90 was the bill's spe-
cific procedures for three types of accommodation for child witnesses:
videotaped depositions, in camera videotaped testimony, and in cam-
era live testimony. Upon a request by the prosecuting or defense at-
torney and upon a showing of compelling need, the court may order
any of the specific accommodations.40
To determine whether a compelling need exists to videotape the
child's testimony or to implement in camera proceedings, the court
must riake particularized findings on the record.41 The court must
38. Professor Potuto stated:
On the constitutional question, the confrontation clause of the United
States Constitution has never in all circumstances required eye-to-eye
contact between the defendant... and the witness .... [To my knowl-
edge [there has never been a] court that has said in all circumstances the
accommodation is unconstitutional. The Nebraska Supreme Court [in
State v. Warford], for example, found that the particular procedures in a
case in Nebraska were not demonstrably needed in order to obtain the
testimony of the child. The court did not say, however, that if the show-
ing were made the accommodation would be unconstitutional.
Public Hearing, supra note 35 (statement of Josephine Potuto).
39. The American Psychological Association (APA) states that no present evidence
indicates that all children will be injured by confrontation with a defendant in a
particular case. However, the APA has stated that evidence shows some children
may be harmed. Nebraska's statute addresses the group of children that would
be harmed. If a compelling need is shown, the child may testify through video-
tape or in camera procedures. See infra note 112.
40. LB 90 § 3(8); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926(8)(Cum. Supp. 1988). For purposes of
implementing any of the three special accommodations, a child is any person
eleven years old or younger at the time the motion to take the deposition is made.
LB 90 § 3(7); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(7) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
41. In effect, the court's determination insures that the videotaped testimony will not
be used unless the child is unable to testify at trial, as required by Ohio v. Rob-
erts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), when admitting previous out-of-court statements. See in-
fra text accompanying notes 121-24.
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consider six factors:
a) the nature of the offense; b) the significance of the child's testimony to the
case; c) the likelihood of obtaining the child's testimony without modification
of trial procedure or with a different modification involving less substantial
digression from trial procedure than the modification under consideration; d)
the child's age; e) the child's psychological maturity and understanding; and f)
the nature, degree, and duration of the potential injury to the child from
testifying.4 2
The court may order an independent examination by a psycholo-
gist or a psychiatrist 43 if the defense attorney disputes the showing of
compelling need by the prosecuting attorney.44 After a finding of
compelling need by the court, neither party can call the child as a live
witness at trial unless the compelling need no longer exists.45
The purpose of the videotaped testimony ordinarily is to prepare
testimony that will be used in lieu of any courtroom appearance. 46
However, if the child does testify in person, the child's testimony may
be conducted in camera upon a showing of cause.47 Where in camera
testimony is used, the defendant and child will be in a position to see
one another on closed-circuit television monitors.48
When the court orders testimony to be preserved by videotape, the
court must designate the time and place for taking the testimony.49
Ordinarily, the testimony will be taken in the presence of the prosecu-
tor, the defense attorney, the defendant, and any other individuals
deemed necessary by the court, such as the parent or guardian of the
child.50 The court must ensure that the defense attorney has adequate
time to complete discovery before the videotape is taken5 l and must
preside over the testimony as if the child were called as a witness dur-
42. LB 90 § 3(8); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(8) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
43. Gary Melton, Ph.D., has found this provision questionable. He indicates that psy-
chologists have no specialized knowledge or expertise beyond the court's ability
to determine whether a child should testify in open court. In addition, Melton
suggests that subjecting children to psychological evaluation may invade their
privacy. However, the benefits conferred by the videotaping procedure may out-
weigh any privacy invasions. Interview with Gary Melton, Chairman of the Law-
Psychology Program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, Neb. (Sept.
1988).
44. LB 90 § 3(9); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(9) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
45. Id. at § 3(10); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(10) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
46. Id. at § 3(1); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(1) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
47. Id. at § 3(4); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(4) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
48. Id. at § 3(6); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(6) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
49. The deposition may be conducted in the courtroom, judge's chambers, or any
other suitable location. Id. at § 3(1)(a); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(1)(a) (Cum.
Supp. 1988).
50. If the child's parent or guardian is allowed to be present, he or she may sit with or
near the child unless the court determines that the presence of the parent or
guardian would disrupt the child's testimony. Id. at § 3(2); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
1926(2) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
51. Id. at § 3(1)(b); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1926(1)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
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ing the trial.5 2 All of the above procedures were included in LB 90 to
preserve the defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation to
the fullest extent possible.53
III. THE PRINCIPLES BEHIND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
The sixth amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trail, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.5 4
There have been many Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to
confrontation under the sixth amendment. This Comment is not
designed to exhaust all of the case law on this topic, but rather to give
an overview of the principles the Supreme Court has stated are the
foundation of the right to confrontation.
The Court has consistently stressed that confrontation is essential
to fairiess.55 In general, the Supreme Court has stated that confron-
tation ensures that the witness will give his or her statements under
oath, thereby emphasizing the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the chances of perjury. In addition, confrontation forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination and permits the jury to ob-
serve the demeanor of the witness making the statement and to assess
the witness's credibility.56
According to the Supreme Court, the confrontation clause guaran-
tees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with the witnesses appearing
before the trier of fact.57 Recent cases have described a "literal right
to 'confront' the witnesses at the time of trial" as forming "the core of
values furthered by the Confrontation Clause."58
The Supreme Court has found physical confrontation and cross-
examination important in preserving a defendant's sixth amendment
right to confrontation. However, the right to confrontation is not ab-
52. Id. at § 3(1)(c); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
53. Id. at § 1; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1925 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment' protections apply to the states
under the fourteenth amendment. The Nebraska Constitution also provides for
the defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses. NEB. CONST. art. I § 11. This
Nebraska constitutional provision has been interpreted and applied consistently
with the sixth amendment's guarantee to confrontation. See State v. Thaden, 210
Neb. 622, 316 N.W.2d 317 (1982).
55. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1970).
56. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
57. See Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2800 (1988).
58. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970).
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solute. In some cases, a defendant may waive his right to confronta-
tion by stipulating to the admission of certain evidence,5 9 by
threatening or intimidating the witnesses, 60 or by engaging in disrup-
tive behavior in the courtroom. 6 1 Furthermore, a defendant who
pleads guilty waives his right to confrontation. 62 The Supreme Court
has recognized that occasionally the right to confrontation must give
way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of a particu-
lar case. 63
The question of whether it was constitutionally permissible to ac-
commodate child witnesses through the use of a special procedure
designed to keep the defendant out of the child witness's view recently
was discussed in Coy v. Iowa.64 In Coy, a statute authorizing the use of
either in camera testimony or a screen to block the witness's view of
the defendant was challenged.65 The defendant was charged with two
counts of committing lascivious acts with a child. During the defend-
ant's trial, a screen was placed between him and the two complaining
witnesses, thereby blocking him from their sight. The trial court
made lighting adjustments in the courtroom so that the defendant
could see the witnesses, but the witnesses were unable to see the
defendant.
The defendant argued that the procedure violated his right to con-
frontation. 66 The trial court rejected the claim and convicted the de-
fendant on both counts. The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed. The
United States Supreme Court focused on the literal right to "con-
front" the witness at the time of trial.
The perception that confrontation is essential to fairness has persisted over
the centuries because there is much truth to it. A witness "may feel quite
differently when he has to repeat his story looking at the man whom he will
harm greatly by distorting or mistaking the facts."... It is always more diffi-
cult to tell a lie about a person "to his face" than "behind his back."
6 7
The Court noted that the confrontation clause does not compel the
witness to fix his eyes on the defendant, as the witness may look else-
where. Nevertheless, there is a profound effect on the witness who
has to stand in the presence of the person he or she accuses. Although
that face-to-face presence may upset a truthful child victim, it also
59. Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1965).
60. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976).
61. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
62. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
63. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1985).
64. 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988).
65. IOWA CODE § 910A.14 (1987).
66. The appellant also argued that his due process rights were violated because the
procedure would make him appear guilty and thus erode the presumption of in-
nocence. However, the trial court rejected this argument. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct.
2798, 2799 (1988).
67. Id. at 2802 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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may "confound and undo the false accuser or reveal the child coached
by a malevolent adult."68
The Court determined that in the present case the defendant's
right to confrontation was violated because the trial court failed to
make individualized findings that the witnesses needed special protec-
tion. Thus, the judgment of the trial court was reversed. The Court
concluded:
To hold that our determination of what implications are reasonable must
take into account other important interests is not the same thing as holding
that we can identify exceptions, in light of other important interests, to the
irreducible literal meaning of the clause: "a right to meet face to face all those
who appear and give evidence at trial."... We leave for another day, how-
ever, the question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they
would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public
policy.6 9
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor noted that in certain
cases it might be appropriate to weigh the interests of a state in pro-
tecting child witnesses more heavily than the defendant's right to con-
frontation and to permit the use of certain procedural devices
designed to shield a child witness from the trauma of courtroom testi-
mony. Although Justice O'Connor agreed that the defendant's right
to confrontation had been violated by the use of the screen, she
pointed out:
I wish to make it clear that nothing in today's decision necessarily dooms all
such efforts by state legislatures to protect child witnesses. Initially, many
such procedures may raise no substantial Confrontation Clause problems
since they involve testimony in the presence of the defendant....
Moreover, even if a particular state procedure runs afoul of the Confronta-
tion Clause's general requirements, it may come within an exception that per-
mits its use. There is nothing novel about the proposition that the Clause
embodies a general requirement that a witness face the defendant.... But it
is also not novel to recognize that a defendant's "right physically to face those
who testify against him," even if located at the "core" of the Confrontation
Clause, is not absolute, and I reject any suggestion to the contrary in the
Court's opinion. Rather, the Court has time and again stated that the Clause
"reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial," and expressly
recognized that this preference may be overcome in a particular case if close
examination of "competing interests" so warrants....
Thus I would permit use of a particular trial procedure that. called for
something other than face-to-face confrontation if that procedure was neces-
sary to further an important public policy. The protection of child witnesses is,
in my view and in the view of a substantial majority of the States, just such a
policy.7 0
Although Coy prohibited the use of a screen blocking the wit-
nesses' view of the defendant, Coy did not deal with the in camera
procedures also authorized by the Iowa statute. To date, the Supreme
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2803 (citations omitted).
70. Id. at 2804-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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Court has not considered the question of whether the use of in camera
testimony in a criminal prosecution violates the defendant's right to
confrontation. However, the confrontation question has been ad-
dressed in state courts.71
A. State Court Decisions
Several state court decisions have addressed the question of
whether the use of in camera testimony violates the defendant's right
to confrontation. 72 For example, in Hochheiser v. Superior Court,73
the court considered the use of in camera testimony in the prosecution
of a defendant for lewd conduct with a minor. The procedure pro-
posed by the prosecutor would have enabled the witness to see the
defendant and the cross-examiner, and would have enabled the de-
fendant to see the witness. Although the defendant raised constitu-
tional objections to this procedure, the appellate court did not reach
the constitutional issues because it held that the trial court did not
have the power to permit the accommodation without statutory au-
thority. Although the court did not rule on the confrontation issue, it
did indicate that before such an accommodation was employed to pre-
vent additional injury to a child victim, the prosecution must present a
factual basis supporting the nature of the potential injury to the
witness.
In contrast, the court in State v. Sheppard74 was more amenable to
the use of in camera testimony. In Sheppard, the state allowed a child
victim of sexual abuse to testify via closed-circuit television. A hear-
ing was held to consider the need for the procedure during which a
forensic psychiatrist testified about the potential trauma the child
might experience if the child was forced to testify in the courtroom.
In addition, two attorneys who had prosecuted sex abuse cases testi-
71. For cases dealing with in camera testimony see In re Appeal in Pinal County
Juvenile Action, 147 Ariz. 302, 709 P.2d 1361 (Ct. App. 1985)(two juvenile defend-
ants were excluded from the courtroom and allowed to watch testimony of child
victim's six-year-old brother via closed-circuit television; such procedure was con-
stitutionally permissible because defendants had threatened the child before
trial); People v. Algarin, 129 Misc. 2d 1016, 498 N.Y.S.2d 977 (Sup. Ct. 1986)(com-
pelling interest of the State and the presence of the defendant's attorney to en-
sure proper cross-examination allowed the use of two-way closed-circuit
television); Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 366 Pa. Super. 361, 531 A.2d 459 (1987)(use
of closed-circuit television to obtain testimony of child abused by a family mem-
ber did not violate defendant's right to confront the witness because face-to-face
confrontation was found to pose a danger to the child's psychological well-being);
In re James A., 505 A.2d 1386 (R.I. 1986) (in camera interview of abused child
conducted by the judge did not violate rights of confrontation or due process be-
cause attorneys were allowed to submit questions for the judge to ask).
72. See supra note 71.
73. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
74. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
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fied that potential difficulties with children's testimony might be elim-
inated by the use of in camera proceedings.
Although there was no statutory authority to permit the use of
such an accommodation, the court noted the use of such procedures in
other states, and delineated a specific procedure that would be fol-
lowed in implementing the closed-circuit presentation.75 According to
75. The use of in camera testimony would be permitted when the following condi-
tions were met:
1. The testimony of the child victim shall be taken in a room near the
courtroom from which video images and audio information can be pro-
jected to courtroom monitors with clarity.
2. The persons present in the room from which the child victim will tes-
tify (testimonial room) shall consist, in addition to the child, only of the
prosecuting and defense attorneys, together with the cameraman.
3. The only video equipment to be placed in the testimonial room shall
be the video camera and such tape recording equipment as may be appro-
priate to carry out the conditions herein set forth.
4. The courtroom shall be equipped with monitors having the capacity to
present images and sound with clarity, so that the jury, the defendant,
the judge, and the public shall be able to see and hear the witness clearly
while she testifies....
5. It shall not be necessary to conceal the video camera A videotape
shall be made containing all images and all sounds projected to the
courtroom which tape shall be introduced in evidence as a state exhibit.
6. No bright lights shall be employed in the testimonial room.
7. Color images shall be projected to the courtroom by the video camera.
8. The video camera shall be equipped with a zoom lens to be used only
on notice to counsel who shall have an opportunity to object.
9. The video camera, the witness and counsel shall be so arranged that all
three persons in the testimonial room can be seen on the courtroom
monitors simultaneously. The face of the witness shall be visible on the
monitor at all times, absent an agreement by counsel or direction by the
court for some other arrangement. The placement of counsel in the tes-
timonial room shall be at the discretion of each counselor.
10. The defendant and his attorney shall be provided by the State with a
video system which will permit constant private communication between
them during the testimony of the child witness.
11. An audio system shall be provided connecting the judge with the tes-
timonial room to the end that he can rule on objections and otherwise
control the proceedings from the bench.
12. In the event testimony is being recorded by use of a mechanical sys-
tem, the video monitors or one of them shall be so connected so that
equipment as to record all of the child witness's testimony.
13. In the event the proceedings are being recorded by a court stenogra-
pher, that stenographer shall remain in the courtroom and shall rely
upon the video monitors for the purpose of recording the testimony of
the child victim.
14. All video equipment, the videotape and the cameraman, shall be pro-
vided by and at the expense of the State.
15. The oath of the child witness may be administered by the judge using
the audio equipment, or by the court clerk who may enter the testimo-
nial room for that purpose only, or otherwise as the judge may direct.
16. The testimony of the child victim shall be interrupted at reasonable
intervals to provide the defendant with an opportunity for person-to-per-
son consultation.
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the procedure, the child, prosecutor, defense attorney, and cameraman
would be in the room in which the child would testify, and the defend-
ant would be in the courtroom with the judge and jury. The defendant
and those in the courtroom would at all times be in a position to see
the child, and the defendant would have the means to communicate
with his attorney.1 6 The court found the procedure satisfied the re-
quirements of the sixth amendment. It stated:
The Confrontation Clause is not implacable in its demands. Nearly every
authority agrees that it is subject to exceptions. In reaching the conclusion, as
this court has, that the use of... [closed-circuit] testimony in this case of child
abuse is permissible, it is accepted as a fact that only a modest erosion of the
clause, if any, will take place. The child, through the use of video, will not be
... exposed to the usual courtroom atmosphere. Nevertheless, the defendant
as well as the judge, the jury, and the spectators, will see and hear her clearly.
Adequate opportunity for cross-examination will be provided. This is enough
to satisfy the demands of the confrontation clause. If it is not, it represents a
deserved exception .... Everything but "eyeball-to-eyeball" confrontation
will be provided. No case has held eye contact to be a requirement. It is not
demanded when a witness "confronts" a defendant in the courtroom.
7 7
The Sheppard court then described the risk in which the child
would be placed if she were required to testify in open court. The
court stated that competing interests, if" 'closely examined,' may war-
rant dispensing with confrontation at trial .... Child abuse cases pres-
ent such interests."7 8
B. Nebraska Decision: State v. Warford
After the original LB 90 was introduced, but before it was
adopted, 79 the Nebraska Supreme Court was asked to determine to
what extent a trial court might constitutionally limit confrontation to
accommodate the needs and emotional fragility of a child sexual as-
sault victim. In State v. Warford,80 the defendant claimed that his
constitutional rights were violated by the use of in camera testimony
absent statutory authority.S1 The defendant was charged with first-
17. The trial court, before the child victim testifies, shall provide the jury
with appropriate instructions concerning the videotape presentation.
18. These conditions have been adopted by the court after counsel has
been provided with the opportunity to make objections to them.
Id. at 442-43, 484 A.2d 1349-50.
76. The case was decided before Coy v. Iowa, and thus, did not find it unconstitutional
for the child to be unable to see the defendant. However, under Coy, this proce-
dure probably would be modified to have a two-way closed-circuit procedure to
comply with the requirement that the child be in a position to see the defendant.
See supra text accompanying notes 64-70 for a discussion of Coy v. Iowa.
77. State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 432, 484 A.2d 1330, 1342-43 (1984).
78. Id. at 433, 484 A.2d at 1343.
79. LB 90 was first introduced in 1985 and then was reintroduced in 1987 with minor
changes. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
80. 223 Neb. 368, 389 N.W.2d 575 (1986).
81. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered the admissibility of video-
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degree sexual assault of a child under four years of age. The victim
indicated that she had been abused one evening when her mother was
playing bingo. Before trial, the defendant filed a motion objecting to
the competency of the victim to testify because of her age. During the
competency hearing, the only persons present were the judge, child,
social worker, and court reporter. The record did not indicate
whether the defendant's attorney had been notified of the interview.
Upon a determination that the victim was competent to testify as a
witness, the child was called to testify at trial.82 However, shortly after
taking the stand, she became uncooperative. The prosecuting attorney
asked the child if she could show him what happened to her if all the
people in the courtroom were not present; she agreed. The prosecut-
ing attorney then moved to examine the witness in a separate room
outside the presence of the jury, and to allow the defendant and the
jury to watch the examination in the courtroom on a closed-circuit
television monitor.8 3
Over defense counsel's objections that the procedure would violate
the defendant's constitutional rights by denying him the right to con-
front the witness, the trial court stated that the procedure was appro-
taped depositions absent any specific statutory authorization. In United States v.
Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979), the court addressed the issues of whether a
live, face-to-face meeting is part of the sixth amendment right to confrontation,
and whether a videotaped deposition is admissible absent a statute permitting
such admission. In Benfield, the defendant was excluded from the deposition
room. Basing its decision on Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Dowdell
v, United States, 221 U.S. 325 (1911); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899);
and Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895), the court concluded that the
defendant's right to confrontation was violated:
Normally the right of confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting at
trial at which time cross-examination takes place.... While some recent
cases use other language, none denies that confrontation required a face-
to-face meeting ... and none lessens the force of the sixth amendment.
Of course, confrontation requires cross-examination in addition to a face-
to-face meeting. The right of cross-examination reinforces the impor-
tance of physical confrontation. Most believe that in some undefined but
real way recollection, veracity, and communication are influenced by
face-to-face challenge. This feature is a part of the sixth amendment
right additional to the right of cold, logical cross-examination by one's
counsel. While a deposition necessarily eliminates a face-to-face meeting
between witness and jury, we find no justification for further abridg-
ment of the defendant's rights. A videotaped deposition supplies an en-
vironment substantially comparable to a trial, but where the defendant
was not permitted to be an active participant in the video deposition, this
procedural substitute is constitutionally infirm.
United States v. Benfield, 593 F.2d 815, 821 (8th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
82. The trial court determined that the child understood the nature of the proceed-
ings and that she would be truthful in her statements and answers. State v. War-
ford, 223 Neb. 368, 370, 389 N.W. 2d 575, 578 (1986).
83. While using the equipment, the defense attorney and the defendant had no
means of communication, and the judge could not monitor the activity in the
courtroom. Id.
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priate because of the child's age. Further, the court indicated that the
defendant's rights would be protected by permitting the defendant's
attorney to confer with his client before cross-examination.8 4
However, even in private chambers the child remained uncoopera-
tive. The prosecuting attorney asked permission for the child's thera-
pist to question the child. Again, over defense counsel's objections,8 5
the court allowed the therapist to question the child. The therapist
asked a series of leading questions and, following a recess, the thera-
pist was allowed to question the child alone. Only after the therapist
completed her examination was the defense attorney allowed to enter
the room and cross-examine the child. The prosecuting attorney con-
ducted the redirect. At no time did the judge have any means to exer-
cise control over the examination of the witness or interrupt the
questioning to rule on objections made by defense counsel.
On appeal, the defendant argued that his constitutional rights
under the confrontation clause were violated by the use of the in cam-
era procedure. The defendant argued: 1) the state failed to show any
need for the innovative means used in questioning the child; 2) the
jury and the defendant were not physically present in the room in
which the witness was testifying; 3) no means were provided by which
the defendant's objections could be made; and 4) no means were pro-
vided to prevent the therapist's use of leading questions.
Although the Nebraska Supreme Court was sympathetic to the
growing problems associated with prosecuting sexual abuse cases,8 6
the court refused to strip the defendant of his constitutional rights.
The court indicated that new procedures should be implemented in
the courts, but the procedures must be more carefully planned to pro-
tect the competing interests of the child witness and the defendant.
84. Id.
85. The defense attorney objected to the examination being conducted by someone
who was not an attorney and who was an officer of the State. Id. at 372, 389
N.W.2d at 579.
86. The court stated that "it would be remiss to close its eyes to the ever increasing
problems associated with child victimization and the child's role in prosecuting
the perpetrators of such crimes." Id. The court looked to reports suggesting that
eight percent of cases of child sexual abuse involve a stranger, while the majority
of such cases involve a member of the child's family or the child's acquaintances.
The court was concerned that a low percentage of assaults that are brought to
the attention of authorities lead to criminal prosecutions. Many cases involve a
decision by the prosecutor not to prosecute because little physical evidence exists
and the only witness is the child who may be perceived as an unreliable or incred-
ible witness by the jury. In addition, many children are not allowed to testify
because of the psychological harm they would experience from participating in
the trial. See D. WHITCOMB, E. SHAPIRO & L. STELLWAGEN, WHEN THE VICTIM IS
A CHILD: ISSUES FOR JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS 4, 6, & 13-20 (1985); Note, The
Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innova-
tions, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806 (1985).
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Looking to the available case law, the Nebraska Supreme Court
held that the right to confrontation could be infringed only by a show-
ing of compelling need. In addition, when infringement "must [occur
it must] be as minimally obtrusive as possible."8 7 The court found that
the trial court had not required the state to stay within minimal con-
stitutional guidelines and, thus, denied the defendant his right to
confrontation.
The court stated that a compelling need to protect the child wit-
ness from testifying must be shown.88 Once an adequate showing of
need is on the record,8 9 the use of tools such as closed-circuit television
must be minimally intrusive,9 0 and the camera should be situated so
that all persons present in the room where the examination is being
conducted (other than the cameraman) should be on camera at all
times.91
The court agreed that it was proper to allow a parent, therapist, or
other person who might offer the child support to be present during
the examination. However, the court held that questioning of the wit-
ness must be done by persons "authorized to participate in the pro-
ceeding as members of the bar."92 "At the very least, the defendant
must at all times have a means of communicating with his attorney,
and the court must be able to control the examination by interrupting
the questioning to rule on objections."93
Although no established procedure existed for conducting testi-
mony in camera at the time of Warford, LB 90 now provides such a
procedure. The question of whether LB 90 can withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny is examined below.
87. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 375, 389 N.W. 2d 575, 581 (1986).
88. Warford relied on two cases to require a specific showing of special circum-
stances, i.e., a compelling need as defined under the new statute: United States v.
Benfield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979), and Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.
App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). Warlord concluded that whether curtail-
ment or diminishment of confrontation rights might be constitutionally permissi-
ble depends on the factual context of each case. Exceptions should be narrow in
scope and based on necessity or waiver. Extreme care must be taken to strike the
correct balance between the policies protecting the mental health of the child
victim and the right of the accused to a fair trial. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368,
376, 389 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1986).
89. The court found that the record did not show that the attempt to examine the
child in open court was frustrated by the child's failure to cooperate. State v.
Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 376-77, 389 N.W.2d 575, 581 (1986).
90. The court relied on State v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (1984).
91. State v. Warford, 223 Neb. 368, 377, 389 N.W.2d 575, 582 (1986).
92. Id. at 377-78, 389 N.W.2d at 582.
93. Id. at 377, 389 N.W.2d at 581.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF LB 90'S PROVISIONS FOR THE USE OF IN
CAMERA TESTIMONY
Several issues from the confrontation clause cases discussed above
are pertinent to a discussion of the constitutionality of LB 90's in cam-
era testimony provisions. Although a defendant's attorney would be
able to conduct a thorough cross-examination of the child witness,
other issues arise besides cross-examination. Other possible concerns
about LB 90 are the jury's ability to evaluate the witness's credibility
and a defendant's opportunity to physically confront the witness. Fur-
thermore, a compelling need should be demonstrated to justify the use
of such procedures. However, even if the LB 90 safeguards slightly
infringe a defendant's constitutional rights, the infringements may be
justified by an appropriate policy determination, in this case the ac-
commodation of child witnesses.
A. Face-to-Face Confrontation
One of the reasons the defendant's conviction in Warford was re-
versed was because the defendant had been denied the opportunity to
see the witness and have the witness see him during the witness's tes-
timony. Although the sixth amendment reflects a preference for face-
to-face confrontation at trial,g4 lower courts such as Sheppard have
found that in camera testimony satisfies the physical confrontation re-
quirement. Essentially the only difference between the in camera
procedure and an in-person, courtroom appearance by the child would
be that the child would probably be in a separate room and be viewed
by the defendant, the jury, and any spectators through a television
monitor in the courtroom.
Unlike the Iowa statute in Coy,95 which required the defendant to
be kept out of the child's line of vision, LB 90 provides that "the child
shall at all times be in a position to see the defendant ... on camera," if
necessary to preserve the constitutionality of the testimony.96 Under
Coy, the child would likely be required to be in such a position to meet
the requirements of physical confrontation.
Testimony of a witness who testifies against the accused is more
reliable when the accused has had the opportunity to confront the wit-
ness face-to-face. As pointed out in Coy, it is more difficult to lie in
front of the witness than it is if the witness does not have to see the
person whom he or she accuses.97 LB 90 permits the defendant to be
94. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
95. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
96. See supra note 48.
97. Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798, 2802 (1988). See also Herbert v. Superior Court, 117
Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981), in which the defendant was charged
with oral copulation of a five-year-old. The seating in the courtroom had been
rearranged so that neither the child nor the defendant could see one another.
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within the child's sight at all times via a television monitor, thus les-
sening the threat of fabrication.98
B. The Opportunity for Cross-Examination
Another reason the defendant's conviction in Warford was re-
versed was because the defendant had been denied the opportunity to
cross-examine the child witness. According to LB 90, the child would
testify like any other witness at a trial except that the defendant and
others in the courtroom would view the child via a television moni-
tor.99 The child would be under oath just as" at trial and subject to
cross-examination by defense counsel.oo LB 90 explicitly provides for
the right of cross-examination, as the in camera testimony shall be
taken "in the same manner ... as [for any other] . .. witness for the
prosecution during the course of the trial."1
C. The Jury's Opportunity to Judge the Witness's Credibility
One element to confrontation is the opportunity for the jury to de-
termine the credibility of the witness by observing him or her on the
stand. Rowever, no court has ever read the confrontation clause so
literall as to require jury observation of every witness in person.102
Whdre in camera testimony is used, the jury will be able to view
the withess on a television monitor. Thus, the jury should be able to
have ve!rbal and nonverbal cues available to determine the witness's
credibility.
D. Demonstration of a. Compelling Need
Coy, Hochheiser, and Warford emphasized the fact that findings
should be made on the record to justify the use of special accommoda-
However, the defendant and the judge, the judge and the witness, and the defend-
ant and both the prosecutor and defense counsel were in view of one another.
The court held that this arrangement violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right, stating:
The historical concept of the right of confrontation has included the
right to see one's accusers face-to-face, thereby giving the fact-finder the
opportunity of weighing the demeanor of the accused when forced to
make his or her accusation before the one person who knows if the wit-
ness is truthful. A witness's reluctance to face the accused may be the
product of fabrication rather than fear or embarrassment.
Id. at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
98. See supra note 48.
99. See supra note 47.
100. See supra note 52.
101. Id.
102. To require jury observation of every single witness would negate the operation of
virtually every established hearsay exception. See infra text accompanying note
147.
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tions for child witnesses. LB 90 provides that a compelling need be
specifically indicated. The courts may consider factors such as a
child's age, psychological maturity, and potential injury to the child
from testifying. 03 These determinations may be made through expert
evaluation. Requiring the prosecution to prove that the child would
be psychologically harmed protects the defendant's rights by requiring
sufficient justification for the use of the procedure.
E. Accommodation as a Proper Public Policy
The Supreme Court in Coy and the court in Sheppard recognized
that a defendant's right to confrontation may be subject to important
public policy considerations.1 04 To determine whether accommodat-
ing child sexual abuse victims is a proper case for any possible in-
fringement of the defendant's right to confrontation, 05 the State of
Nebraska would have to demonstrate a compelling interest in the wel-
fare of the child witnesses.1 06 Such a demonstration should not be
difficult.
Traditionally, the United States Supreme Court has held that safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors and pro-
tecting minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and
embarrassment are compelling state interests. For example, in Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,10 7 the Supreme Court considered a
mandatory closure statute that excluded the press and general public
from the courtroom during testimony by minor sex offense victims.
Although the Court declared mandatory closing of trials unconstitu-
tional, the Court concluded that particularized determinations in indi-
vidual cases could be made to exclude the press and the public
consistent with the first amendment:
[Tihe circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of
the [state's) interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case basis
whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor victim....
[The State's] interest could be served just as well by requiring the trial
103. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
104. See also Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
105. For example, some might argue that the defendant's right of confrontation may
be lessened by having the testimony taken through in camera live testimony, or
in camera videotape testimony, as the child and defendant would not be in each
other's physical presence. LB 90 § 3(8); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1926(8) (Cum. Supp.
1988).
106. When viewing legislatively authorized procedures that potentially deprive the de-
fendant of his fundamental right to a fair trial, the legislation must be strictly
scrutinized. The strict scrutiny standard requires that the classification be justi-
fied by a compelling state interest which is "'necessary ... to the accomplish-
ment' of its legitimate purpose." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33
(1984)(quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964))(child custody de-
termined on the basis of race violates the equal protection clause).
107. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the State's legitimate con-
cern for the well-being of [a child] .. necessitates closure. Such an approach
insures that the constitutional right of the press and [the] public to gain access
to criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to protect the
State's interest.1 0 8
Child sexual abuse is recognized as a pervasive wrong.109 Although
many cases of child sexual abuse are reported in the United States," 0
a significant percentage of child abuse cases are either dismissed
before trial or result in acquittals as a result of problems in getting the
child to testify."' For some children, the experience of testifying in
open court may be traumatic,"12 but the state needs such testimony to
prosecute a child abuser. LB 90 makes accommodations for child wit-
nesses and provides for particularized findings of risk of trauma. By
requiring particularized findings, a defendant's rights can be carefully
balanced against a child's needs, thus safeguarding a defendant's sixth
amendment rights.
V. PRIOR TESTIMONY AND THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE
Part of the theory and principle behind the right to confrontation
is indelibly linked to the practice of excluding hearsay statements
from eVidence. Historically, the exclusion of hearsay statements did
not develop as a distinct idea until the early 1700s.113 Early in the
history of jury trials, the jury acquired knowledge of the case from
designated witnesses who did not testify in open court. Statements
made by such individuals were termed ex parte affidavits. The hear-
say rule evolved because the validity of ex parte affidavits began to be
108. Id. at 608-09.
109. See supra note 1.
110. Ethical and practical problems exist in obtaining valid estimates of the preva-
lence of sexual abuse, but the research indicates that sexual abuse is under-re-
ported. Melton, Children's Testimony, supra note 2, at 181-83.
111. Often children's parents decide it would be too stressful for the child to confront
his or her abuser in court and therefore dismiss the case. In other cases, when
the child does testify, the child breaks down emotionally and therefore his or her
testimony is seen as inconsistent or unreliable by the jury.
112. In Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987), the American Psychological Associa-
tion (APA) submitted an amicus brief discussing the need for the special accom-
modations for child witnesses. According to APA, little social science data exists
to support the general proposition that face-to-face confrontation by child sexual
abuse victims with their alleged abusers has any more negative psychological ef-
fects than such confrontation has for adult victims. APA suggested that some
victims may experience benefits by vindicating their rights and regaining control
over their lives. Nevertheless, APA stated in the amicus brief that in circum-
stances where the risk of trauma is documented, a special accommodation may be
the proper mechanism to protect the child.
113. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364 (J. Chadbourne rev.
ed. 1974).
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seriously questioned.114
Historically, the right of the defendant to confront adverse wit-
nesses is said to have originated from the trial of Sir Walter Ra-
leigh.115 Sir Walter Raleigh was convicted of treason after a trial by
affidavit; he was never allowed to confront his accusers, or to summon
witnesses in his own behalf. In response to this injustice, drafters of
the United States Constitution incorporated the right to confront ad-
verse witnesses in the sixth amendment.
Generally, the right to confrontation is to be exercised during the
course of the trial. However, the Supreme Court has allowed the pros-
ecution to use testimony taken prior to the trial when the defendant
has had the opportunity to confront the witness at the time the prior
testimony was taken, and when there was a demonstration that the
witness was unavailable to appear at trial.116 A discussion of some of
the principle cases in which the admission of prior testimony was at
issue follows.
A. Supreme Court Decisions
In 1895, the United States Supreme Court first examined the ad-
missibility of prior testimony consistent with the confrontation clause
in Mattox v. United States.1"7 In Mattox, the defendant was convicted
of murder, but on appeal the conviction was reversed and remanded
for a new trial. Before the new trial, the prosecution's key witnesses
died. Over the defendant's objections, the transcribed testimony of
the dead witnesses from the first trial was admitted into evidence in
the second trial. The Court concluded that the rights of the public
would not be served by declaring such evidence inadmissible. The
Court stated:
The primary object of the [right to confrontation] was to prevent depositions
or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in .-ivil cases, being
used against [a] prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examina-
tion of the witness in which [an] accused has an opportunity, not only of test-
ing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of
compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look
at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he
gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.118
The Court determined that the defendant's rights had not been vio-
lated because he had been given the opportunity to cross-examine the
114. Id.
115. See Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Ra-
leigh Loses Another, 8 CRIM. L. BULL 99 (1972). This article presents selected
testimony and statements made by Sir Walter Raleigh at trial.
116. See Kirst, The Procedural Dimension of Confrontation Doctrine, 66 NEB. L. REv.
485, 504-07 (1987).
117. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
118. Id. at 242-43.
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witnesses at the time the statements were made at the first trial. Fur-
thermore, the witnesses were dead, and thus unavailable to be called
at the second trial.
Continuing to follow the purposes stated in Mattox, the Court fur-
ther addressed the admissibility of prior testimony in Kirby v. United
States.119 In Kirby, the defendant was convicted of having received
stolen federal property. The prosecution had introduced the record of
conviction of the alleged thieves to prove that the property had been
stolen. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the use of
the record of another proceeding denied the defendant his sixth
amendment right to confrontation. The defendant had not been given
the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the time the state-
ments introduced into evidence had been made, and no evidence Was
introduced to show that the witnesses were unavailable to testify at
Kirby's trial.
The Court later imposed the sixth amendment right to confronta-
tion on the states under the fourteenth amendment in Pointer v.
Texas.1 o In Pointer, the defendant and co-defendant were charged
with robbery. At the preliminary hearing, the complainant testified
that the defendants had robbed him at gunpoint. Neither defendant
was represented by counsel, and thus, no effective cross-examination
occurred. After the defendants were indicted, the complaining wit-
ness moved to California. The witness did not return for trial, and the
prosecutor introduced the testimony from the examining trial. The
defendant was convicted, but the Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion. The Court concluded that the defendant was denied the opportu-
nity for cross-examination guaranteed by the sixth amendment
because he had not been represented by counsel at the hearing where
the testimony was given.
More recently the Court addressed the admissibility of prior testi-
mony in Ohio v. Roberts,12' in which the Supreme Court determined
that under certain conditions out-of-court statements could be
presented when a declarant was unavailable for trial. In Roberts, the
defendant was convicted of forgery and the use of stolen credit cards.
At the defendant's preliminary hearing, the victim's daughter testified
that she had not given the defendant permission to use her parents'
credit cards. However, at the defendant's trial the victim's daughter
was unavailable because her whereabouts were unknown. The state
introduced the testimony from the preliminary hearing, and the de-
fendant objected on the grounds that admission of the testimony vio-
lated his right to confrontation. Both the Ohio Court of Appeals and
the Ohio Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, and the defend-
119. 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
120. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
121. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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ant's conviction was reversed. However, the Supreme Court rein-
stated the conviction. The Court stated:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial,
the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of
reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evi-
dence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evi-
dence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness.1 2 2
In Roberts, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's assertion
that the Court must undertake a particularized search for indicia of
reliability before admitting the preliminary hearing testimony of an
unavailable witness under the "prior recorded testimony" exception to
the hearsay rules.123 The Court held that the testimony provided suf-
ficient guarantees of trustworthiness because the defendant was rep-
resented by counsel; the defendant had the opportunity to cross-
examine the witness when the testimony was given; the witness was
under oath; and the hearing took place before a judicial tribunal. Ar-
guably, the type of videotaped testimony taken under LB 90 would fall
under the former testimony exception, 1 2 4 but to date the Supreme
Court has not considered the question of whether the use of video-
taped testimony in a criminal prosecution violates the defendant's
right to confrontation. However, the confrontation question has been
addressed in state courts. 1 25
122. Id. at 66.
123. Prior recorded testimony is admissible under Nebraska's rules of evidence. NEB.
REV. STAT. § 27-804(2)(a) (1985).
124. See supra note 16.
125. For cases dealing with the admission of videotaped evidence in criminal prosecu-
tions for child sexual abuse, see Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807
(1987)(videotaped deposition was improperly admitted because counsel did not
comply with statutory procedures governing the admissibility of videotaped depo-
sitions); McGuire v. State, 288 Ark. 388, 706 S.W.2d 360 (1986) (statute authorizing
videotaping of depositions satisfies the right to confrontation where testimony of
child is before the judge in chambers and is in the presence of the defendant, his
attorney, and the prosecutor, and where the opportunity exists for cross-exami-
nation); State v. Jarzbek, 204 Conn. 683, 529 A.2d 1245 (1987) (possibility that the
alleged victim of sexual abuse might be psychologically harmed by direct confron-
tation with the accused is not enough to justify the exclusion of the defendant
from the videotaping of the child's deposition to avoid "eyeball-to-eyeball" con-
frontation); Gaines v. Commonwealth, 728 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1987) (although stat-
ute was replete with protections to ensure that the recording was accurately
made in a non-threatening environment, no provisions were established to deter-
mine child's competency to testify); In re R.C., 514 So. 2d 759 (La. Ct. App.
1987)(statute allowed the admission of pretrial videotaped testimony when 1) no
attorneys were present during the taping, 2) the child was not asked leading ques-
tions, 3) the person conducting the interview was available at trial, 4) the defense
was given the opportunity to review the video before trial, and 5) the child was
available to testify at trial; admission of videotaped statements of a five-year-old
sex abuse victim did not violate accused juvenile's sixth amendment rights); State
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B. State Court Decisions
Several state court decisions have addressed the question of
whether videotaping a child witness's testimony and admitting the
videotape into evidence at trial violates the defendant's right to con-
frontation.26 For example, in Long v. State,127 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals considered the admissibility of videotaped testi-
mony in child sexual abuse cases and ruled on the constitutionality of
the Texas videotape statute. In Long, the defendant was convicted of
sexually abusing a child.128 He was given the maximum sentence pos-
sible: twenty years in the Texas Department of Corrections and a
$10,000 fine. A pretrial videotaped interview was taken pursuant to
section 38.071 of the Texas Criminal Procedure Code and was used at
the defendant's trial.129
An interview was conducted by the director of the Dallas Rape Cri-
sis Center and was recorded on a videotape.130 During the interview,
the twdlve-year-old complainant explained the sexual incidents that
v. Peazell, 486 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 1986)(admission of videotape did not vio-
lad3 defendant's right to confront the witness where State offered videotape as
direct testimony of child and child was subject to cross-examination); State v.
Seever, 733 S.W.2d 438 (Mo. 1987)(testimony introduced first on videotape and
thdn supplemented by calling child to stand resulted in improper enhancement of
imact of child's testimony and prejudiced defendant); State v. Vigil, 103 N.M.
583, 711 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1985)(statute held constitutional).
126. See supm note 125.
127. 742 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 130 (1988).
128. The defendant violated section 21.10 of the Texas Penal Code, later changed to
section 22.011 and section 22.021 (Supp. 1986-87).
129. The Texas statute provided in part:
2(a) The recording of an oral statement of the child made before the
proceeding begins is admissible into evidence if:
(1) no attorney for either party was present when the statement was
made;
(2) the recording is both visual and oral and is recorded on film or
videotape or by other electronic means;
(3) the recording equipment was capable of making an accurate re-
cording, the operator of the equipment was competent, and the recording
is accurate and has not been altered;
(4) the statement was not made in response to questioning calculated
to lead the child to make a particular statement;
(5) every voice on the recording is identified;
(6) the person conducting the interview of the child in the record is
present at the proceeding and available to testify or be cross-examined
by either party;
(7) the defendant or the attorney for the defendant is afforded an
opportunity to view the recording before it is offered into evidence; and
(8) the child is available to testify.
TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon 1979). This statute was amended
in 1987 to better protect defendants' constitutional rights. See TEX. CraM. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 38.071 (Vernon Supp. 1989).
130. Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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occurred between her and the defendant.13 1 Using anatomically cor-
rect dolls, the complainant "revealed a sordid and disgusting series of
sexual activities between her and the appellant."'32 The videotaped
testimony was admitted and played for the jury.133 The defendant
claimed that the admission of the videotaped testimony deprived him
of his right to confrontation. The Texas statute in question did not
enable the defense attorney to be present to cross-examine the child.
Rather than simply being a means by which testimony could be taken
outside the presence of the jury, it was a means by which the child
could make a statement without pressure or questioning by adver-
sarial counsel and without seeing the alleged perpetrator of the crime.
The court addressed the constitutional challenge to the statute per-
mitting the admission of the videotape into evidence, focusing on the
fact that the defense counsel was unable to cross-examine the child's
statement presented via videotape. The court stated that the absence
of cross-examination was indicative of testimony lacking indicia of re-
liability. The court stated:
[I]t was recognized long ago that cross-examination is a defendant's opportu-
nity of "not only testing the recollection [of the witness] and sifting through
the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with
the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor or
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives testimony whether he is
worthy of belief."
1 3 4
The court stated that the statute basically authorized a "significant
departure from established trial procedure by dispensing with the re-
quirement that the prosecution develop its case in chief in the court-
room, in the presence of the judge, jury, and the defendant."135
Because the prosecutor would use the videotaped testimony in lieu of
live testimony, in effect, the witness would not be available for cross-
examination unless the defendant called the witness to testify. The
court found this to be violative of the right to confrontation:
It is an illogical as well as unconstitutional scheme to place a defendant,
who, again, must be presumed innocent, in the untenable position of either
requiring the child to testify and thereby run the very real risk of incurring
the wrath of the jury or forgo the right to invoke "the greatest legal engine
ever invented for the discovery of truth," [which is cross-examination]. 136
131. According to the child, the appellant was her mother's boyfriend who had lived
with them for several years. Her first sexual encounter occurred with the appel-
lant when she was five and one-half years old. Id.
132. Id.
133. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called the child to testify in person. During the rebut-
tal testimony, the child related to the jury essentially the same series of sexual
encounters, and consequently, the defendant claimed that the child's testimony
was "improper bolstering." Id. at 305.
134. Id. at 315-16 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895)).
135. Id. at 314.
136. Id. at 321 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
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On the other hand, in Harp v. State,131 the Indiana Court of Ap-
peals found the use of videotaped testimony in criminal trials to be
constitutionally permissible. In Harp, the defendant was convicted of
sexual abuse after videotaped testimony of his three-year-old victim
was admitted during his trial. The deposition was taken in substantial
compliance with a statute authorizing the taking of a child's deposi-
tion, although the statute had not yet gone into effect.' 38 The child
137. 518 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
138. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (Burns Supp. 1988) provides in part:
(b) On the motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may order that:
(1) The testimony of a child be taken in a room other than the courtroom
and be transmitted to the courtroom by closed circuit television; and
(2) The questioning of the child by the prosecution and the defense be
transmitted to the child by closed circuit television.
(c) On the motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may order that
the testimony of a child be videotaped for use at trial.
(d) The court may not make an order under subsection (b) or (c) unless:
(1) The testimony to be taken is the testimony of a child who:
(A) Is less than ten (10) years of age;
(B) Is the alleged victim of an offense listed in subsection (a) for
which the defendant is being tried or is a witness in a trial for an offense
listed in subsection (a);
(C) Is found by the court to be a child who should be permitted to
testify outside the courtroom because:
(i) A psychiatrist has certified that the child's testifying in the court-
room would be a traumatic experience for the child;
(ii) A physician has certified that the child cannot be present in the
courtroom for medical reasons; or
(iii) Evidence has been introduced concerning the effect of the child's
testifying in the courtroom, and the court finds that it is more likely
than not that the child's testifying in the courtroom would be a trau-
matic experience for the child;
(2) The prosecuting attorney has informed the defendant and the de-
fendant's attorney of the intention to have the child testify outside the
courtroom; and
(3) The prosecuting attorney informed the defendant and the defend-
ant's attorney under subdivision (2) within a time that will give the de-
fendant a fair oppbrtunity to prepare a response before the trial to the
prosecuting attorney's motion to permit the child to testify outside the
courtroom.
(e) If the court makes an order under subsection (b), only the following
persons may be in the same room as the child during the child's
testimony;
(1) Persons necessary to operate the closed circuit television equipment.
(2) Persons whose presence the court finds will contribute to the child's
well-being.
(3) A court bailiff or court representative.
(f) If the court makes an order under subsection (c), only the following
persons may be in the same room as the child during the child's video-
taped testimony:
(1) The judge.
(2) The prosecuting attorney.
(3) The defendant's attorney (or the defendant, if the defendant is not
represented by an attorney).
(4) Persons necessary to operate the electronic equipment.
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witness, the child's mother, a court reporter, a case worker, a psychol-
ogist from a mental health center, a camera operator, and the defend-
ant's counsel were present at the deposition. The defendant was able
to observe the proceeding through a closed-circuit television moni-
tor.139 The court concluded that the defendant's rights were not vio-
lated because the defendant's counsel was present and was given the
opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time the videotaping
was done.
VI. ANALYSIS OF LB 90'S PROVISIONS FOR THE USE OF
VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS
Reconciling both the admissibility of prior videotaped testimony
and the defendant's right to confrontation raises several important is-
sues. Prior recorded testimony should provide the jury with the op-
portunity to judge the witness's credibility and should have sufficient
indications of reliability. However, other questions remain. Whether
the defendant is able to cross-examine the witness at the time the dep-
osition is taken is tantamount to the admissibility of the testimony, as
is a determination that the witness is unavailable at the time of the
trial.
A. Face-to-Face Confrontation and Cross-Examination
Although the Supreme Court has recognized that the confronta-
tion clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at
trial,140 the Supreme Court has allowed prosecutors to use testimony
taken prior to the trial where a defendant had the opportunity to ade-
quately cross-examine a witness at the time prior testimony was
taken.14 1
(5) The court reporter.
(6) Persons whose presence the court finds will contribute to the child's
well-being.
(7) The defendant, who can observe and hear the testimony of the child
without the child being able to observe or hear the defendant. However,
if the defendant is not represented by an attorney, the defendant may
question the child.
(g) If the court makes an order under subsection (b) or (c), only the fol-
lowing persons may question the child:
(1) The prosecuting attorney.
(2) The defendant's attorney (or the defendant, if the defendant is not
represented by an attorney).
(3) The judge.
139. The court used only a one-way closed-circuit system so that the child was not able
to see the defendant. Under Coy, this procedure probably would have to be modi-
fied to have a two-way closed-circuit procedure to comply with the requirement
that the child be in a position to see the defendant. See supra text accompanying
notes 64-70 for a discussion of Coy v. Iowa.
140. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
141. See supra text accompanying note 116.
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LB 90 provides for the use of prior testimony through the use of
videotaped testimony in criminal trials.142 Arguably, the only signifi-
cant difference between the videotaped testimony and the child's
court appearance is that the jury and the public are excluded. At the
videotaping session, the child would likely be sworn in and would be
under oath, as at trial. The defendant would be present during the
child's testimony unless otherwise required by the court.143 In this
context, present could mean either physically present in the same
room, or present by way of a television monitor during the videotap-
ing.144 In either case, the child "shall at all times be in a position to
see the defendant."145
Unlike the Texas statute in Long, which was declared unconstitu-
tional because the defendant was not given the opportunity for cross-
examination, LB 90 explicitly provides for the right of cross-examina-
tion. LB 90 states that the videotaped testimony shall be taken "in the
same manner as if the child were called as a witness for the prosecu-
tion duving the course of the trial."146 Therefore, when the prosecutor
moves to admit the prior videotaped testimony of a child witness,
there should be no grounds for a constitutional objection on the basis
that th& defendant did not have adequate opportunity to physically
confront and cross-examine the witness at the time the prior testi-
mony was taken.
B. Thd Jury's Opportunity to Judge the Witness's Credibility
Although one element to confrontation is the opportunity of the
jury to determine the credibility of the witness by observing him or
her on the stand, no court has ever read the confrontation clause so
literally as to require jury observation of every witness. Such an ap-
proach would negate the operation of virtually every established hear-
say exception. 147 If the jury had to view every witness in open court,
142. See supra text accompanying note 6.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 50, 52.
144. See supra note 42.
145. See supra text accompanying note 48.
146. See supra text accompanying note 52.
147. Kinkeade, Criminal Procedure: Pretrial, 40 Sw. L.J. 569, 630 (1986). See also
State v. Roy, 214 Neb. 204, 333 N.W.2d 398 (1986). In Roy, the Nebraska Supreme
Court stated that the confrontation clause is not violated where the statement
admitted into evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability to afford the trier of
fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the statement. The court
stated: "[T]he mission of the confrontation clause is to advance practical concern
for the accuracy of the truth determination process in criminal trials by assuring
that the trier of fact has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statement." Id. at 207, 333 N.W.2d at 401. The court affirmed a defendant's con-
viction of first-degree sexual assault upon his two-year-old stepdaughter. The
court found that admission of an excited utterance by the child was permissible.
It concluded that the age of the victim, her battered physical condition, the na-
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out-of-court statements previously held to be constitutionally admissi-
ble suddenly would be inadmissible.
Although observation of the witness by the jury is important, Wig-
more points out that the focus of the confrontation clause actually is
on cross-examination:
The essential requirement of the hearsay rule, as just examined, is that
statements offered testimonially must be subjected to the test of cross-exami-
nation. But a process commonly spoken of as confrontation is also often re-
ferred to as an additional and accompanying test or as the sole test.
Now confrontation is, in its main aspect, merely another term for the test of
cross-examination. It is the preliminary step to securing the opportunity of
cross-examination; and, so far as it is essential, this is only because cross-ex-
amination is essential. The right of confrontation is the right to the opportu-
nity of cross-examination. Confrontation also involves a subordinate and
incidental advantage, namely, the observation by the tribunal of the witness'
demeanor on the stand, as a minor means of judging the value of his testi-
mony. But this minor advantage is not regarded as essential, i.e., it may be
dispensed with when it is not feasible. Cross-examination, however, the es-
sential object of confrontation, remains indispensable. 1 4 8
Unlike admitting a written transcript of preliminary hearing testi-
mony, which has been held to be constitutionally permissible,149 a
videotape would afford the jury some evidence of demeanor. LB 90
requires that all persons are to be visible on camera except the camera
operator when testimony is taken so that the jury can have all verbal
and nonverbal cues available when determining the credibility of a
witness. 15 0
C. Unavailability
The Supreme Court has stated that some out-of-court statements
are admissible when the prosecution establishes that the declarant is
unavailable to testify at trial,151 because such statements are "pre-
ferred over complete loss of the evidence." 152 However, the problem
of determining whether the admission of such evidence would violate
a defendant's right to confrontation has troubled the court system.153
To determine whether a witness is unavailable to testify at trial
ture of the event, and the child's fear of additional injury provided a sufficient
basis of reliability for the child's statement to qualify as an acceptable exception
to the hearsay rule.
148. J. WIGMORE, supra note 113, § 1365 (emphasis in original).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18 for a discussion of Mattox v. United
States.
150. Although one might argue that having all those people on camera at one time
would make the testimony seem unnatural, the approach is better than having
the camera select what the jury will see at any given time. This way the jury can
observe the reactions of others, just as they could in the courtroom.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 121-24 for a discussion of Ohio v. Roberts.
152. See FED. R. EvID. 804 advisory committee's note.
153. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970). The Supreme Court has recog-
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because of mental illness or infirmity, courts generally require expert
testimony to establish the existence of such a condition.54 Case law
indicates that the evidence must establish that the witness would suf-
fer severe, perhaps permanent injury if he or she were forced to tes-
tify in open court.155
While any court proceeding is traumatic for a victim,156 special
need must be demonstrated to implement the videotaping proceed-
ings. If nothing more than a request to use the procedure is required,
the use of such electronic means is arguably unconstitutional.15 7 How-
ever, LB 90 does not allow blanket videotaping. Rather, it requires a
particularized finding of need.
LB 90 provides an approach consistent with other videotape stat-
utes upheld by state courts as constitutional. The statute requires that
a compelling need be specifically determined based on such factors as
the child's age, psychological maturity, and potential injury from testi-
fying.'5 8 Such a determination may be made based on findings of a
psychological or psychiatric examination.159
Requiring the prosecution to prove that the child would be psycho-
logically harmed and thus qualify as unavailable facilitates the court's
efforts to reconcile society's desire to accommodate the special needs
of child victims with the defendant's constitutionally guaranteed right
to confrontation. 1 6 0 The prosecution must demonstrate a legitimate
need for protection. The need generally will be demonstrated through
nized that the values protected by the hearsay rules and the confrontation clause
are not to be equated.
154. See Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981).
155. See People v. Stritzinger, 34 Cal. 3d 505, 194 Cal. Rptr. 431, 668 P.2d 738 (1983).
See also Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821 (D.C. 1981) in which the court
proposed the following factors as guidelines for determining whether a witness is
available to testify:
(1) the probability of psychological injury as a result of testifying,
(2) the degree of anticipated injury,
(3) the expected duration of the injury,
(4) whether the expected psychological injury is substantially greater
than the reaction of the average victim of rape, kidnapping or terrorist
act.
Id. at 830 n.18. Such factors should be considered in light of the nature of the
crime and the past psychological history of the witness.
156. Galante, New War on Child Abuse: Reforms Are Making Prosecutions Easier,
NAT'L L.J., June 25, 1984, at 28, col. 4.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 127-36 for discussion of Long v. State, in which
a Texas videotaping statute requiring no particularized finding of need was de-
clared unconstitutional.
158. See supra note 42.
159. See supra note 44.
160. Some commentators suggest that the need to use the videotaping or in camera
procedures may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence rather than be-
yond a reasonable doubt. See Note, supra note 8, at 287-88.
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expert testimony rather than relying solely on the testimony of family
members and friends.
Once the child is determined to be unavailable and the child's testi-
mony may be videotaped, the child's unavailability is presumed to con-
tinue at the time of trial.161 After a finding of compelling need by the
court, neither party may call the witness to testify in open court
before the jury unless that party demonstrates that the compelling
need no longer exists.162 As long as the child is not called and the
videotape is the only testimony of the child presented, the defendant is
not subjected to "improper bolstering,"16 3 a concern raised in Long
when the trial court impermissibly allowed the child to testify in court
to the same sexual acts after her initial testimony by videotape.
D. Reliability
An unavailable witness's prior statements may be admissible if
they bear certain "indicia of reliability."1 6 4 Where the evidence falls
into a traditional hearsay exception, reliability may be inferred.165
Arguably, the type of videotaped testimony taken under LB 90 is
permissible under the pre-existing exception for former testimony.166
Nevertheless, the admissibility of videotaped testimony should satisfy
the test of reliability under Roberts. So long as the witness is under
oath, the defendant is present, defense counsel is given the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the witness, and the testimony takes place
before the judge, the videotaping should possess the necessary indica-
tions of reliability required under Roberts.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has recognized the need to protect child wit-
nesses. In Coy, Justice O'Connor suggested that the protection of sex-
ual abuse victims was a proper public policy that perhaps would allow
a state to implement procedures that might infringe upon a defend-
ant's right to confrontation. Nebraska's interests in the protection of
the emotional well-being of child sex offense victims and the need of
their testimony to ensure successful prosecutions are compelling.
LB 90 has outlined a proper procedure for the use of videotaped
and in camera testimony of child witnesses at trial. The legislature
has taken every precaution to preserve the rights of a defendant. Pro-
cedures similar to those declared constitutional in other states can be
161. See supra note 45.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 133.
164. For a discussion of Ohio v. Roberts, see supra text accompanying notes 121-24.
165. See supra text accompanying note 122.
166. See supra note 16.
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found in LB 90. When the procedures outlined by LB 90 are followed,
a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses is preserved.
LB 90 should be a great asset to prosecutors who must call children
as witnesses, but who are reluctant to do so for fear of traumatizing
the children. LB 90 accommodates child witnesses while protecting
defendants' sixth amendment rights. Thus, LB 90 should withstand
constitutional scrutiny.167
Emily Campbell '91
167. Most cases dealing with new technology have not addressed the issue of whether
videotaped or in camera testimony violates the defendant's right of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. See supra note 21 for a discussion of the de-
fendant's right of due process. More investigation of this constitutional right is
needed to determine whether LB 90 can withstand all constitutional attacks.
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